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Abstract
The issue of over-utilization of medical procedures has generated strong
debate in the United States. It is well acknowledged that, in the agency
relationship between physicians and patients, the informational advan-
tage gives doctors an incentive to deviate from the appropriate treatment
as dened for a patients health status, thus incurring over- or under-
utilization. However, the empirical consequence of this problem has not
been adequately considered. In particular, physician agency breaks the
correspondence between appropriate treatment and observed treatment,
generating a problem whose characteristics and e¤ects on estimation are
analogous to a classication error. However, the error is non-random.
Empirical literature that does not consider the misclassication problem
understates the impact of clinical and non-clinical factors on healthcare
utilization.
This paper proposes a structural misclassication model in which the
physician behavior is modeled to characterize the structure of the mea-
surement error. The model captures the interaction between a physicians
incentives and a patients health status, and returns consistent estimators.
It also lets us identify the degree of deviation from appropriate treatment
(misclassication probability) due to physician incentives, and to com-
pute risk-adjusted utilization rates based on clinical factors only. The
model is applied to the cesarean section deliveries performed in the state
of New Jersey during the 1999-2002 period. Our results show a moderate
but growing rate of non-clinically required c-sections of around 3.2%. We
conclude that the growth of the c-section rates in New Jersey over these
years is explained mainly by non-clinical factors.
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1 Introduction
Ever since Arrows paper on uncertainty in the healthcare market (Arrow, 1963),
the informational inequality in the doctor-patient relationship has become an
issue that is now well identied (McGuire, 2000). The informational advantage
of physicians regarding patientshealth status creates incentives to overuse or
underuse medical procedures according to specic physicians objectives. Lit-
erature has analyzed this problem from di¤erent perspectives. In the health
economic eld, the focus has been put on physician-induced demand (Fuchs,
1978; Dranove, 1988), where doctors may exert inuence over patients and in-
tentionally shift the patient demand curve, thus increasing health care services
against patientsbest interest. Inducement, however, has a cost for doctors in
terms of professional ethics. Therefore, over-utilization of medical procedures
results when the revenues of inducement overcome the intrinsic cost of acting
against professional ethics.
In health service research literature, growing attention has been placed
on explaining the large variation of utilization rates across geographic areas
(Wennberg, 2002; Fuchs et al., 2001). There is strong evidence that these re-
gional disparities are not related to clinical factors. Fear of litigation, racial
biases, socioeconomic di¤erences and institutional di¤erences are among the
non-clinical factors that have an inuence on clinical outcomes. However, when
it comes to utilization of medical procedures, this literature is unable to identify
under- and over- healthcare utilization clearly. Because the observed rates are
currently a¤ected by non-clinical factors, it is di¢ cult to construct a health-
related benchmark to dene appropriate utilization rates.
The literature that has focused on health care quality has also found a sim-
ilar problem. In this case, there are at least two goals: First, the denition of
medical standards or guidelines for specic treatments. Second, the elaboration
of quality indexes to report hospital or physician quality level ratings using stan-
dard methodologies to compute case-mix risk adjusted rates (Iezzoni, 2003). In
both cases, it is important to nd the clinical factors that dene an appropriate
treatment. However, studies that are based on observed treatments may be
contaminatedwith the e¤ect of non-clinical factors. As the patient-physician
relationship involves a particular interaction between the patients health status
and the physicians incentives, controlling for non-clinical factors by itself is not
enough to correct the problem.
Although the fact that physician incentives a¤ect health care utilization
rates is known, it has not been adequately considered in empirical literature.
The usual approach has been to estimate binary dependent models (usually
logit or probit) and control for clinical or non-clinical factors depending on the
variables of interest. However, this approach does not consider that physician in-
centives break the correspondence between appropriate treatment and observed
treatment. The denition of appropriate treatment is based on patient health
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status only, the latter being only observed by the physician. When incentives are
strong enough, the physician deviates from appropriate treatment and, there-
fore, the observed treatment will not reect the clinical characteristics of the
patient. In that regard, this problem can be seen as a misclassication problem
where the measurement error in the binary dependent variable is proportional
to the strength of physician incentives to deviate from appropriate treatment.
Two examples are illustrative. The rst is related to racial di¤erences in
healthcare access. One of the most studied cases is lower access to cardiovas-
cular procedures in African Americans (Kressin and Peterson, 2001; Ford and
Cooper, 1995; Van Ryn and Burke, 2000). In this case, an African American
patient with a poor health condition requires a cardiovascular surgery. Based on
health status, the appropriate treatment -observed only by the doctor- should
be the utilization of the procedure. However, if the doctor has a racial bias, he
may inuence the treatment choice by omitting to suggest the surgery. In that
case, the observed outcome will be misclassied resulting in under-utilized
cardiovascular procedures for African Americans.
However, some authors suggest that, in the case of cardiovascular surgeries,
the problem is not under-use for African Americans, but over-use among white
patients (Schneider et al., 2001). This means that, based on additional non-
clinical factors, the doctor may also inuence treatment choice for white patients
by suggesting the surgery when it is not required. In this case, both over-
and under-healthcare utilization coexist, and the observed outcome will thus
be misclassied in both directions: observation of surgery when it was not
required, and no observation of surgery when it was required.
The second example is related to the demand inducement theory, where fee-
for-service pricing creates nancial incentives for the physician to recommend
unnecessary medical procedures. A well known case is cesarean section delivery
(Gruber and Owings, 1996; Das, 2002; Tussing and Wojtowycz, 1993). While
the doctor sees which delivery method is warranted by the womans health sta-
tus, this trueresponse is not seen by the econometrician. If nancial incentives
are strong enough to overcome professional ethics, the doctor will inuence a
woman to have a c-section even though it is not clinically necessary. In this
case, the appropriate choice is a¤ected by the physicians decision, resulting in
a misclassied outcome that is identied by the econometrician. Note that
in this example, misclassication runs in one direction only: observation of
c-section when it is not required. This happens because there is no monetary
incentive to perform a vaginal delivery, and, to top it o¤, there is fear of liti-
gation. These factors result in a strong disincentive to avoid a vaginal delivery
when a c-section is required.
Since this problem is analogous to the misclassication problem, it also
shares its consequences. In general, measurement error on limited dependent
variables (misclassication) leads to biased and inconsistent estimators. When
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misclassication is not adequately corrected, it understates parameter estimates,
and overstates standard errors. Literature has focused mainly on the case where
misclassication is originated randomly by errors in the report or record of a cat-
egorical variable (Hausman et al., 1998; Magder and Hughes, 1997; see Kenkel et
al., 2004 for an application). Additionally, Abrevaya and Hausman (1999) and
Lewbel (2000) have considered the case in which misclassication depends on
some covariates, imposing strong conditions for identication. However, there
are cases where a decision maker is able to alter the true outcome. When this
happens, the classication error will not be random, but a behavioral model
can be used to incorporate the structure of the measurement error into the
estimation process in order to nd consistent estimators.
The main contribution of this paper is a methodology based on a struc-
tural misclassication model to estimate the impact of physician incentives on
healthcare utilization. This brings three improvements compared to previous
literature: First, we obtain consistent estimates for the patients health risk
factors and the physiciansincentives. Second, we model a physicians behavior
and its interaction with a patients health status. Third, we are able to estimate
the rate of inappropriate treatments dened as those related to non-clinical fac-
tors (misclassication probability) and the risk-adjusted utilization rate based
only on health characteristics (removing non-clinical factors).
The second section of this paper describes the structural misclassication
model and establishes a parametric solution. In the third section, we use a
Monte Carlo study to compare the e¤ect on estimators consistency of four
di¤erent approaches to estimate risk-adjusted utilization rates, ranging from
not considering the misclassication problem to considering it adequately. The
fourth section provides an application to the case of cesarean section deliveries
in New Jersey. The last section provides conclusions to this paper, discusses
related research in progress and directions for future research.
2 A parametric estimation of structural mis-
classication
In the examples presented in section I, the physician observes the true health
condition of his patient. Conditioned on the patients health status, the doctor
may deviate from appropriate treatment. This will happen if his personal goals
overcome his professional ethics within his utility function. Therefore, the struc-
ture of this model is a simplied version of game theory models of inducement
(De Jaeguer and Jegers, 2001; Xie et al. 2006). It is a simple version because
we do not explicitly consider the patients decisions. The physicians decision
tree is shown in Figure 1. In the rst stage, nature determines a patients state
(healthy h < 0, or sickly h  0), and this can only be observed by the physi-
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cian. Two treatments are considered: A and B. However, only one treatment
is appropriate for each patients health state.
In the second stage, the physician must choose the treatment based on his
incentives (i). Based on the patients health state (h), he may decide to perform
the treatment that is appropriate for the patient (i < 0) or an inappropriate one
(i  0). However, the physician will choose the treatment that, after discounting
the intrinsic cost of acting against professional ethics, gives him more utility
in terms of monetary and non-monetary factors. Therefore, the physician will
choose treatment A or B:For instance, a doctor may inappropriately recommend
treatment A (cardiovascular surgery) for a healthy White patient and treatment
B (no surgery) for a sickly African American patient. On the other hand, an
obstetrician may inappropriately recommend treatment A (c-section) for both,
risk and non-at-risk pregnant women.
Figure 1: Physicians decision tree
Notice that a more complete model may explicitly include a third stage
where the patient accepts or rejects the treatment based on obtained medical
information (Xie et al. 2006). However, Figure 1 may be seen as a one-step
backward induction in which physicians take patientsactions into consideration.
In that regard, index i in the utility function represents incentives that are net
of the cost implied by acting against the doctors ethical standards, but also the
expected loss that would occur when a patient that is well informed decides to
leave the doctor. The expected loss depends on how well the physician knows
his patient (that is, if he knows the patient could collect medical information
on his own, as well as their degree of resistance to physicians inuence).
The econometric model is described following gure 1. In the rst stage, a
patients health status (h) is determined by a set of observable clinical charac-
teristics or risk factors (x) and unobserved risk factors (h) .The physician can
observe a patients health condition:
5
h = x + h (1)
This is the health status equation. There are two possible treatments, ~y =
f0; 1g. The patient will require treatment ~y = 1 if health status equals or
exceeds zero
~y =

1; if h = x + h  0
0; otherwise
The Econometrician observes the doctors treatment choice y but not ~y.
Without physician incentives to alter the required treatment y = ~y; and in that
case any binary model estimation (logit or probit) will be consistent because
the probability of observing the treatment choice and the probability of not
observing it are respectively
Pr (y = 1) = Pr (~y = 1) = Pr (h  0)
Pr (y = 0) = Pr (~y = 0) = Pr (h < 0)
However, if the physician decides to do the surgery when it is not needed -like
in the cesarean section case- or not to do the procedure when it is required -like
in the case of cardiovascular surgery- then the binary model estimation will be
inconsistent because Pr (y = 1) 6= Pr (~y = 1). In those cases the econometrician
observes a misclassiedtreatment.
In the second stage, the physician decides to alter the required treatment
based on his incentives (i). Incentives depend on doctors characteristics and
patients characteristics that are observed (z) and unobserved (i) by the doctor.
i = z + i (2)
This is the physician incentives equation. When incentives equal or exceed
a threshold 0, the doctor may proceed, depending on health status, with the
inappropriate treatment, thus altering the appropriate choice with probabilities
(misclassication probabilities)
0  Pr (y = 1 j ~y = 0) = Pr (i  0 j h < 0) (3a)
1  Pr (y = 0 j ~y = 1) = Pr (i  0 j h  0) (3b)
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0 is the probability of over-utilization (doctor performs a surgery when it is
not required). 1 is the probability of under-utilization (doctor does not perform
a surgery when it is required). These two probabilities dene the probability of
observing the surgery:
Pr (y = 1) = Pr (i < 0 j h  0)Pr (h  0) + Pr (i  0 j h < 0)Pr (h < 0)
= 0 + (1  0   1) Pr (h  0) (4)
Note that the second equality in equation (4) corresponds to equation (5)
in Hausman et al. (1998). Clearly, without physician incentives, 0 = 1 =
0 and therefore Pr (y = 1) collapses to Pr (h  0) = Pr (~y = 1), returning the
consistent estimation of binary models. For the cardiovascular example, it is
expected that 0 > 0 when the patient is white and 1 > 0 when the patient
is an African American. This is the case when misclassication runs in both
directions. In this case the probability of observing a patient with (y = 1) or
without (y = 0) cardiovascular surgery is respectively:
Pr (y = 1) = Pr (i < 0 j h  0)Pr (h  0) + Pr (i  0 j h < 0)Pr (h < 0)
Pr (y = 0) = 1  Pr (i < 0 j h  0)Pr (h  0)  Pr (i  0 j h < 0)Pr (h < 0)
For the cesarean section example, we expect over-utilization (0 > 0) be-
cause of the disincentives to proceed with a vaginal delivery when a c-section
is needed. It means that misclassication runs in only one direction given that
1 = 0. In this case the probability of observing a c-section (y = 1) and the
probability of a vaginal delivery (y = 0) are respectively:
Pr (y = 1) = Pr (h  0) + Pr (i  0 j h < 0)Pr (h < 0)
Pr (y = 0) = Pr (i < 0 j h < 0)Pr (h < 0)
Haussman et al. (1998) and Lewbel (2000) discuss the conditions for iden-
tication of misclassication models. In particular, the monotonicity condition
(MC) is required to identify the parameters. For the general misclassication
model, the MC is 0+1 < 0. In terms of our problem, this condition is gener-
ally satised because the degree of physician incentives is relatively small given
the punishment in terms of reputation and lawsuits that result if inappropriate
treatments are very high. Note that in the case of misclassication in one direc-
tion (either over- or under- utilization), the MC is automatically satised since
there is only one probability, which we safely assume is below 1.
The parameters  and  in equations (1) and (2) can be estimated with
MLE, maximizing the likelihood function
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L (; ) =
Y
Pr (y = 1)
y
Pr (y = 0)
1 y (5)
Notice that if the errors h; i are not independently distributed (with corre-
lation ), the problem becomes a bivariate model. Additionally, if it is assumed
that the error terms are normally distributed, the problem becomes a bivariate
probit (Amemiya, 1985). For the general case described by equation (4), the
likelihood function is
L (; ; ) =
Y
[22 (x; z; )]y [1  22 (x; z; )]1 y (6)
Where 2 is standard bivariate normal CDF. Notice that this model is a
variety of Poiriers partial observability model (Poirier, 1980). However, there
are important di¤erences. The partial observability model considers two agents
making decisions based on a common set of information. In this structural
misclassication model, there is only one decision maker: the physician. The
patients health status is not a decision maker and consequently equations (1)
and (2) are generally functions of two separate sets of variables, in contrast to
the partial observability model. A variable may be in both equations if it car-
ries information about the patients health status and the physicians incentives
(some examples are age, sex, weight, etc. depending on the analyzed treat-
ment). Partial observability models have been used to address misspecication
in simple probit or logit models (see for example Abowd and Farber, 1982),
while in this paper partial observability is obtained after adding structure to
the misclassication problem. Finally, the likelihood function of the structural
misclassication model is di¤erent to the partial observability model, but both
models converges when misclassication run in only one direction (under- or
over- utilization). Note that the loss of information due to limited observability
reduces e¢ ciency of the maximum likelihood estimator as in the partial observ-
ability models (Poirier, 1980; Meng and Schmidt, 1985).
The structural misclassication error model presented in this paper rests on
strong parametric assumptions. We have based our estimation on a bivariate
probit, but the model can be easily extended to a bivariate logit. However, a
natural extension is to get rid of the parametric assumptions and estimate this
model semi-parametrically based on a multiple index model as in Ichimura and
Lee (1991).
3 Comparing methodologies: Monte Carlo
simulation
In this section, we study the consequences of omitting or mis-specifying the im-
pact of physician incentives on observed health care utilization. In particular, we
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study how consistency estimation is a¤ected when we use the current method-
ology used in literature to estimate the inuence of clinical factors on health
outcome. The variable of interest is a dichotomous variable indicating whether
the patient received the treatment under study or the alternative treatment (or
no treatment). We consider the case in which physicians have incentives to alter
the required treatment given the patients health status. For simplicity and with
the purpose to connect this study with the empirical application described in
section IV, we focus on the case of physician incentives to over-utilize medical
procedures.
In estimating the e¤ects of clinical risk factors associated with specic treat-
ments, the literature has followed two common approaches1 : (i) Estimation of a
simple binary (SB) model (logit or probit) with clinical factors as the only regres-
sors, and (ii) Estimation of a simple binary model with controls (SBC), where
non-clinical factors are added to the SB model as control variables. Because the
agency problem in the physician-patient relationship creates important interac-
tions between a patients health status and non-medical factors, the omission of
non-clinical characteristics creates a serious omitted variable bias. When non-
clinical factors are added as controls as in the SBC model, the bias is reduced
but interactions are not appropriately captured, and the misclassication bias
described in previous sections is not adequately corrected.
In that regard, we also study the following two approaches based on the
structural misclassication model developed in section II: (iii) Structural mis-
classication model with independent errors (SMCI), and (iv) Structural mis-
classication model where errors are allowed to be dependent (SMC). From
an empirical perspective, the restriction of independent errors may be strong.
Because there are many health characteristics that are non-observable to the
econometrician but observable to the physician, the latter could make deci-
sions based on information conveyed in h. Given that some variables related
to physician incentives are also unobserved by the econometrician, i and h
may be correlated. In that regard, the error correlation also measures physi-
cian incentives that are di¢ cult to observe because either the clinical factors
do not dene clearly what an appropriate treatment is or the physicians incen-
tives go beyond measurable characteristics. Moreover, it is expected that the
error correlation is negative for over-utilized procedures and positive for under-
utilized procedures. Consider the case of the racial bias example described in
sections 1 and 2. If the doctor observes health characteristics that cannot be
easily captured by diagnosis codes or medical guidelines, but that imply a need
to perform surgery on an African American patient, then it will be easier for
a biased doctor to deviate from the appropriate treatment, and regarding any
1To get rid of the potential misclassicationproblem, other approaches have considered
the reviewing of medical records in light of professional guidelines based on clinical trials
or expert opinions. Good examples of these approaches are the RAND guidelines and the
American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association guidelines. For a discussion of
the own problems of these methodologies see Leape et al. (2003).
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observable characteristic, the physicians incentive growths implying a positive
error correlation. A similar argument can be used to expect a negative corre-
lation for over-utilized procedures. For that reason, it is important to evaluate
the consequence of imposing the independence restriction.
In order to assess the impact of these four approaches on estimator bias and
consistency, I examine the results of Monte Carlo simulation. The true model
representing equations (1) and (2) is
h =  1:5 + 0:5x1   x2 + 2x3 + h
i =  2:5  1:5z1 + z2 + 0:5z3 + 2z4 + i
Covariates x and z include dummy variables and continuous variables that
were drawn from uniform distributions and trimmed chi-squared distributions to
avoid outliers. The error disturbances h; i, are drawn jointly from a bivariate
standard normal distribution with correlation  = 0:25. For the design of the
Monte Carlo study we consider 1000 independent random draws of a sample
size of 5000. Table 1 reports the sample mean and standard error of parameters
estimated over the 1000 draws.
The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are consistent with the misclassi-
cation problem described by Hausman et al. (1998). In particular, the simple
probit (SB and SBC models) understates the coe¢ cients. The probit model
with only patients health related variables (SB) produces estimates that are bi-
ased downward by 35-50% (column 1). When physician incentives are added as
control variables (SBC model), bias is still substantial in the case of health risk
factors. Coe¢ cient estimates of control variables (non-clinical characteristics)
have a more substantial downward bias of around 45-70% (column 2).
Bias size in the health status and the non-clinical coe¢ cients depends, among
others, on two parameters: the error correlation and the degree of physician
incentives (misclassication). Di¤erent Monte Carlo designs (not shown) were
used to see the impact of both parameters on estimator biasedness. First, the
bias increases in both sets of estimators when the error correlation gets closer to
1. Given the previous discussion related to the sign of the error correlation, this
result implies that bias will be larger in the case of under-utilized procedures
than in the over-utilized procedures. It is also important to note that even in the
case of small correlation, the bias does not vanish. Second, the bias in the health
status estimators decreases and in the doctors incentives estimators increases
when the degree of incentives falls. A rough exercise shows that the bias in
the health status estimators decreases almost proportionally with the reduction
in the degree of incentives. On the other hand, a reduction in the degree of
incentives increases the bias in the incentive equation more than proportionally
when incentive is high, and less than proportionally when it is low.
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Table 1. Monte Carlo simulations
True Simple Simple Structural Structural
Parameter parameter Binary Binary Model Misclassif. Misclassif.
value Model with Controls w/indp errors Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health related variables
0 -1.50 -0.752 -1.34 -1.508 -1.502
(0.044) (0.074) (0.092) (0.089)
1 0.50 0.311 0.349 0.495 0.502
(0.129) (0.138) (0.178) (0.180)
2 -1.00 -0.544 -0.626 -0.985 -1.005
(0.045) (0.047) (0.085) (0.087)
3 2.00 1.249 1.408 1.972 2.003
(0.068) (0.072) (0.114) (0.117)
Patient and Physician related variables
0 -2.50 - - -2.548 -2.505
(0.215) (0.211)
1 -1.50 - -0.51 -1.488 -1.503
(0.143) (0.321) (0.321)
2 1.00 - 0.301 0.989 0.995
(0.046) (0.127) (0.126)
3 0.50 - 0.176 0.493 0.498
(0.066) (0.144) (0.145)
4 2.00 - 1.069 1.978 2.005
(0.048) (0.127) (0.126)
 0.25 - - - 0.239
(0.193)
Prob. approp. 0.249 - - 0.244 0.250
treatment y (0.015) (0.015)
Prob. physic 0.112 - - 0.100 0.110
incentives z (0.018) (0.020)
n=5000, 1000 simulations. Standard deviations in parentheses.
y Calculated using the marginal probability Pr(h  0)
z Calculated using the marginal probability Pr(i  0)
Estimators of the structural misclassication models (SMCI and SMC) are
consistent but present larger standard errors (columns 3 and 4). Compared with
these models, the simple probit (SB and SBC models) overstates the precision
of its estimates. As an implication for health care quality studies, the impact of
health risk factors on utilization rates will appear to be less important than they
really are when probit or logit is used. Condence intervals will be narrower
too.
There is a small discrepancy between the structural misclassication model
estimators when error independence is erroneously imposed (column 3). In
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general, estimated coe¢ cients of the SMCI model are biased by 1-2% in the case
of risk factors and physician and patient characteristics (column 3). For the
structural misclassication model that allows correlated errors (SMC model),
the estimates are unbiased (less than 0.5%) and show slightly higher standard
errors than the SMCI model (column 4).
An important feature of the structural misclassication model is that it al-
lows us to neatly separate the estimated physician incentives probability and
the utilization rate due to health status only. Table 1 reports the degree of doc-
tors incentives or percentage of misclassication. It was calculated as the mar-
ginal probability that physician incentives exceed threshold zero: Pr (i  0) =R
Pr (i  0; h) dh. The design of the Monte Carlo study implies a true degree of
incentives of 0.112. The degree of incentives estimated by the SMCI model is
downward biased by 11% (column 3), while the SMC model presents a smaller
bias (column 4).
If the goal is to estimate risk-adjusted utilization rates, the appropriate mea-
sure that discards the e¤ect of physician incentives on the misclassication
bias will be the marginal probability of appropriate treatment. For this partic-
ular design where misclassication is related to over-utilization, the appropri-
ate treatment is obtained only when health status exceeds zero, and therefore
Pr (h  0) = R Pr (i; h  0) di will be the estimated utilization rate based on
health status only, under the counterfactual that there are no physician incen-
tives to inuence the appropriate health outcome. For this Monte Carlo study,
true probability of appropriate treatment is 24.9%. The SMCI model under-
states the probability by 1.7% (column 3). The bias is almost zero (less than
0.5%) when the probability of appropriate treatment is estimated using the SMC
model (column 4).
4 An application to cesarean section deliveries
in New Jersey
4.1 Data
This section applies the structural misclassication model to births in the state
of New Jersey in the period 1999-2002. We use Hospital Patient Discharge
Data collected by the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services.
This data contains detailed information on each discharge from an acute care
hospital including identication of the hospital, patient demographics and zip
code of residence, diagnosis and surgical procedures classied by ninth revision
of the International Statistical Classication of Diseases and Related Health
Problems(ICD-9) codes and Diagnosis Related Group numbers (DRG), source
of admission, and identication of payers. Additional socioeconomic information
was collected from the US Census 2000, using the patients zip code as the key
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variable for matching. Births were identied by DRG codes 370-375. Cesarean
sections were identied by DRG 370-371 or ICD-9 code 74xx excluding 7491.
The selected sample includes women aged 15 to 49. We excluded deliveries
performed in hospitals that in a particular year had less than 100 births (0.03%
of the sample). Finally, we also exclude patients with wrong zip codes (0.5%)
and patients with missing or wrong reported information in the variables of
analysis (1.7%). The nal sample used for the estimation considers a total of
403,660 women.
This estimation uses two sets of variables. A rst set comprises womens
health characteristics identied according to diagnosis codes. We follow previ-
ous health service research to select the clinical variables that were seen as more
relevant to explain c-sections (Keeler et al., 1997; Aron et al., 1998; DiGiuseppe
et al., 2001; and Rahnama et al., 2006). The second set of variables comprises
patient and physician characteristics that may drive doctors incentives. The
complete list of variables and their mean values for vaginal and c-section deliv-
eries are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.
4.2 A Model of physician incentives
We use the structural misclassication model described in section 2 to measure
physician incentives and to estimate the probability of appropriate cesarean
section rates by removing non-clinical factors. It is important to highlight
that in a di¤erent context, the physician incentive equation may capture pa-
tients choice rather than physicians inuence. However, because c-sections by
womens choice are not allowed in the USA and because professional guidelines
consider c-sections for non-medical reasons to fall outside the bounds of best
professional practice2 , c-sections related to non-clinical factors are associated
to physician incentives. Even though this model can be easily extended to test
for physician-induced demand (PID), the data collected for this application does
not allow us to identify PID because of lack of an exogenous shock on medical
income on that period.
Again, in the case of c-sections the misclassication runs in only one di-
rection: over-utilization. Assuming standard normal distributions for the error
terms, the model is estimated by MLE using the likelihood function described
in equation (6) that in this case becomes:
L (; ; ) =
Y
[1  2 ( x; z; )]y [2 ( x; z; )]1 y
where the probability of observing a c-section is:
Pr (y + 1) = 1  2 ( x; z; )
2FIGO Statement on Cesarean Section. January 2007. http://www.go.org/Cesarean.asp
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In general, variables in the physician incentive equation may be classied
in two types: First, variables observed by the doctor that signal the degree of
patient-obtained medical information. These are mainly socioeconomic charac-
teristics that can be observed directly (employment, marital status, etc.) or that
can be inferred from patient population (patient ethnicity, patient geographic
area residence, etc.) Usually, patients with lower socioeconomic status have
less access to information, and also have less capability to use such information
in the medical visit (Xie et al. 2006). To capture this e¤ect we include four
variables: (i) Social support, measured as the presence of a partner (married
or life partner), may be perceived to improve the degree of information because
decisions maybe taken on a couple basis. It is expected that it reduces physician
incentives and therefore the probability of c-section. (ii) Womans employment
status may signal a potential compliance to c-sections. It is expected that fully
employed women may prefer a c-section delivery because of the convenience in
terms of scheduling and the lower pre-partum work. Consequently we expect
higher physician incentives for full employed women. (iii) Ethnicity (a White,
Black or Hispanic woman) may be perceived as a signal of access to medical
information. It is expected that minorities have less access and worse use of
medical information, which makes them more vulnerable to physician inuence.
(iv) Patient socioeconomic status is not easily observed by the doctor. Instead,
the physician can infer the socioeconomic status from the zip code of the pa-
tients residence. We include the average household income at zip code level. It
is expected that a zip code with low income is perceived as lower socioeconomic
status, thus increasing vulnerability to physician incentives (Pauly, 1980).
The second type of variables comprises factors that a¤ects directly physician
incentives. These are mainly institutional and contractual variables related
to the physician itself or the health facility. We consider three variables: (i)
The method of payment or patients insurance condition (uninsured, Medicaid,
HMO, other insurance). The type of insurance is important for doctors incen-
tives because it sets the method of payment. It is expected that the uninsured
have the lowest rate of c-sections compared to non-HMO private insurance, since
they must pay for the procedure. The capitation payment of an HMO reduces
physician incentives, and so does prospective payment system under Medicaid.
An additional factor that reduces incentives in the case of Medicaid patients is
the low fees for obstetric procedures observed in New Jersey. (ii) The size of the
hospital measured as the average yearly number of births observed in each hos-
pital. It has been shown that hospital size has an impact of over-utilization due
to the supply-sensitive service phenomenon (Wennberg, 2002). Larger hospitals
usually have larger xed costs increasing the incentive to use more expensive
treatments to keep returns. Consequently, a higher probability of c-sections in
larger hospitals is expected. (iii) The physician specialty (Ob/Gyn specialty)
captures the tendency of over-utilization in more specialized doctors. It is ex-
pected to observe more c-sections when the delivery is attended by a specialist.
Finally, year dummy variables are also included in the estimation of the physi-
cian incentive equation to capture the trend related to non-observed factors.
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The set of variables related to clinical factors is not discussed here and we
refer to the specialized health service literature for details (see section 4.1).
However, it is important to highlight that all these variables are related to
risk of pregnancy and delivery, and therefore they are expected to increase the
probability of a c-section.
4.3 Results
Table A2 in the Appendix reports the estimation using three econometric meth-
ods: The simple binary model (SBM), the structural misclassication model
with independent errors (SMCI), and the structural misclassication model
(SMC). Compared to the SMC model, the simple probit (SBM) understates
both the impact of womans health characteristics and physician incentives (col-
umn 1). However, the bias is greater for incentive related variables, and that is
explained by the small probability of non-clinically required c-sections (misclas-
sication probability) observed in the data (estimated at 3.2%). The di¤erence
between the SMCI model and the SMC model is small in spite of the high
and statistically signicant negative error correlation (column 3). As it was
discussed in section 3, a negative error correlation is expected for over-utilized
treatments.
For the whole period, the estimated marginal probability of physician incen-
tives was 3.2%. This means that 3.2% of healthy, non-risk women had a non-
clinically required cesarean section in the period between 1999-2002, meaning
that each year around 2,500 women have unnecessary c-sections in New Jersey.
Even though the percentage of unnecessary c-sections is relatively small, a more
detailed inspection of the results shows a positive trend in the doctors incentive
equation given by the year dummy variables. As a consequence, it is expected
that most of the growth in the observed c-section rates in recent years can be
explained by physician incentives rather than changes in health conditions in
the population. To test this hypothesis, we compute the probability of appropri-
ate c-sections measured as the marginal probability of c-sections due to health
conditions only (see section 3 for further discussion). This estimated c-section
rate is the rate without any non-clinical inuence, and therefore without mis-
classication. Figure 2 compares both, the observed and the only-health-related
estimated c-section rate. According to this gure, c-section rates in New Jersey
grew from 22.5% in 1999 to 27.5% in 2002. However, the rapid growth started
in 1997 after a long period in which cesarean rates were about 20%. The only-
health-related estimated c-section rate is based on 1999-2000 data. For that
period, it is shown that the rapid growth of c-sections was explained mainly by
non-clinically required c-sections. Without physician incentives, the c-section
rate in New Jersey would have remained almost constant at around 22%, i.e.
just above the levels observed before 1997 when c-sections soared, and more in
line with the recommended rate of 15% of Healthy People and the World Health
Organization (1985).
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Figure 2: Cesarean Section Rates: New Jersey
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Estimated c-section rates (health related only): 1999-2002
What are the determinants of physician incentives? The estimated incentive
equation is shown in Table A2. We structure the discussion of these results
according to the two types of variables described before, and using marginal
calculations for each estimated parameter. We found the expected direction
for all variables related to signaling of the degree of patient-obtained medical
information. Income and ethnicity are observed by physicians as indicators
of patient observed medical information. For the average household income,
an increment of ve thousand dollars reduces the probability of c-section by
0.10%. This small but signicant impact was also observed by Pauly (1980) for
ambulatory care. Ethnicity had an important impact on the probability of c-
sections. Black and Hispanic women have respectively 2.20% and 2.30% higher
probability of having a c-section compared with other non-white ethnicities.
White women have a 2.10% lower probability of c-section delivery. These results
are consistent with previous literature (Aron et al. 2000).
Social support measured as married (or joint in life) women reduces physician
incentives, implying a 1.90% lower probability of a c-section. Compliance to
physicians inuence was captured with womens employment status. As we
expected, full-time employed women have a 7% higher probability of c-section.
Li et al. (2003) show also higher c-section rates for employed women.
The second type of variables related to factors that directly a¤ect physician
incentives also had the expected e¤ect on c-sections. The most important and
studied variable is payment source. With respect to non-HMO private insured
patients, uninsured women are the least a¤ected by doctors incentives, with
reduction in probability of c-section of around 9.20%. Medicaid beneciaries
are the next in lower inuence with reduction in the probability of c-section of
3.40%. Finally, the capitated payment system of HMO reduces the probability
16
of physician incentives, reducing probability of c-section in 1.30%. With respect
to hospital size, our results conrm the supply-sensitive service hypothesis. In
general, births in larger hospitals have higher probability of c-section. For a mid-
size hospital, increasing births in 500 hundred per year raises the probability of a
c-section in 0.10%. A similar argument is validated when we observe that women
attended by more specialized physicians (Ob/Gym) have higher probabilities of
c-section (2.60% more).
5 Conclusions
This paper develops an econometric method to estimate over- and under- uti-
lization of medical procedures. When a physician has incentives that keep him
from choosing the appropriate treatment for a patient, the patients health sta-
tus loses correspondence with the observed treatment. This generates a problem
whose characteristics and e¤ects on estimation are analogous to a classication
error. However, this particular measurement error is not random. This paper
proposes a structural model where the classication error is characterized by
a physician behavior structure. That allows us to consistently estimate risk-
adjusted utilization rates based on clinical factors only, and the probability of
inappropriate treatments based on non-clinical factors (misclassication proba-
bility). Both measures can be neatly separated to test over- or under- healthcare
utilization.
The results of the Monte Carlo study suggest that methodologies based on
bivariate models (e.g. logit or probit) report biased estimates even when clinical
or non-clinical factors are added as control variables. There are important
interactions in the physician-patient relationship that can be captured by the
structural misclassication model developed in this paper. We apply the model
to cesarean section deliveries performed in New Jersey from 1999 to 2002. The
results show that around 3.2% of healthy, non-risky women had c-sections not
due to clinical factors but physician incentives. This rate implies that each year
nearly 2,500 women have c-sections for non-medical reasons implying an excess
cost of around $17.5 millions per year. Finally, it is estimated that physician
incentives explain the rapid growth of c-section rates observed in New Jersey
over these years.
The results of the applied section give direction for further research. A
deeper analysis will be done using non-public data related to physicians and
hospitals characteristics to understand the main drivers of physician incentives.
Additionally, more complete clinical data will be incorporated to measure risk-
adjusted utilization rates at the level of hospitals and physicians. A logit version
of the model will be developed to be comparable with results from the health
service research literature.
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A second extension of the model is the reduction in the parametric assump-
tions. Because this rests heavily on the structure of physician behavior and
distributional assumptions, there is a potential misspecication error that may
set a bias on the estimation. A natural extension is to estimate the structural
misclassication model semi-parametrically. In particular, because the model
results in a partially observable bivariate model, a double-index semi-parametric
model will be explored.
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6 Appendix
Table A1. Sample mean of health and non-health related variables:
New Jersey 1999-2002 (Percentages unless noted)
Variable Vaginal Cesarean Full
Delivery Section Sample
Cesarean delivery 0.00 100.00 24.83
Clinical Variables
Age (years) 28.62 30.47 29.08
Previous cesarean delivery 4.01 42.00 13.44
Multiple gestation 0.71 2.84 1.24
Admission by emergency 5.58 3.30 5.02
Long labor 0.76 0.78 0.77
Elderly primigravida  35 y.o. 0.69 1.39 0.86
Breech or transverse lie presentation 2.40 22.98 7.51
Diabetes 3.45 5.53 3.97
Hypertension 3.24 3.57 3.33
Pre-eclampsia 1.62 1.42 1.57
Oligohydramnios 0.21 0.21 0.21
Polyhydramnios 0.30 0.94 0.46
Abruptio placenta 0.47 0.60 0.50
Full or partial placenta previa 0.10 0.87 0.29
Patient and Physician related variables
Woman is married 65.90 71.48 67.28
Woman is full time employed 34.85 40.46 36.24
White (non-Hispanic) 43.43 44.16 43.61
Black (non-Hispanic) 13.19 12.14 12.93
Hispanic 17.40 17.46 17.42
Zip code mean household income (thousands, $) 56.00 57.15 56.29
Patient payment (uninsured) 8.22 6.41 7.77
Medicaid payment 10.62 8.60 10.11
HMO payment 57.04 58.01 57.28
Yearly average of births in Hospital (thousands) 2.48 2.61 2.51
Obs/Gyn Physician 89.67 91.09 90.02
Number of observations
Total 303,434 100,226 403,660
Year 1999 76,610 22,193 98,803
Year 2000 77,571 24,371 101,942
Year 2001 76,273 26,027 102,300
Year 2002 72,980 27,635 100,615
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Table A2: Model estimation of cesarean section deliveries.
New Jersey 1999-2002
Simple Structural Structural
Variables Binary Model Misclassication Misclassication
with Controls w/indp. errors Model
(1) (2) (3)
Clinical variables
Age 0.009 * 0.010 * 0.010 *
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Previous cesarean delivery 1.856 * 1.982 * 1.950 *
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Multiple gestation 0.487 * 0.517 * 0.507 *
(0.027) (0.023) (0.022)
Admission by emergency -0.207 * -0.290 * -0.277 *
(0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
Long labor 0.244 * 0.251 * 0.248 *
(0.034) (0.030) (0.030)
Elderly primigravida (35+ years old) 0.518 * 0.605 * 0.590 *
(0.031) (0.026) (0.025)
Breech or transverse lie presentation 1.702 * 1.830 * 1.799 *
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Diabetes 0.209 * 0.241 * 0.235 *
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Hypertension 0.107 * 0.121 * 0.118 *
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Pre-eclampsia 0.063 * 0.067 * 0.065 *
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Oligohydramnios 0.085 *** 0.055 0.057
(0.067) (0.062) (0.061)
Polyhydramnios 0.692 * 0.764 * 0.748 *
(0.044) (0.035) (0.035)
Abruptio placenta 0.115 * 0.082 ** 0.083 **
(0.042) (0.039) (0.038)
Full or partial placenta previa 1.357 * 1.476 * 1.448 *
(0.060) (0.046) (0.046)
Intercept -1.510 * -1.669 * -1.659 *
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Dependent variable is mode of delivery. 1 if it was a cesarean section, 0 if it was a vaginal delivery.
Estimation was done in GAUSS. Program code is available under request.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
* Signicant at 1%. ** Signicant at 5%. *** Signicant at 10%
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Table A2: Model estimation of cesarean section deliveries.
New Jersey 1999-2002 (Continued...)
Simple Structural Structural
Variables Binary Model Misclassication Misclassication
with Controls w/indp. errors Model
(1) (2) (3)
Patient and Physician related variables
Woman is married -0.042 * -0.123 * -0.111 *
(0.008) (0.020) (0.019)
Woman is full time employed 0.153 * 0.419 * 0.417 *
(0.007) (0.021) (0.021)
White (non-Hispanic) -0.035 * -0.121 * -0.115 *
(0.008) (0.022) (0.021)
Black (non-Hispanic) 0.017 *** 0.150 * 0.131 *
(0.011) (0.026) (0.025)
Hispanic 0.063 * 0.129 * 0.131 *
(0.010) (0.025) (0.024)
Zip code mean household income -0.002 * -0.004 * -0.004 *
0.000 0.000 0.000
Patient payment (uninsured) -0.139 * -0.449 * -0.459 *
(0.013) (0.056) (0.057)
Medicaid payment -0.068 * -0.169 * -0.175 *
(0.012) (0.030) (0.031)
HMO payment -0.021 * -0.073 * -0.070 *
(0.007) (0.017) (0.017)
Yearly average of births in Hospital 0.010 * 0.026 * 0.027 *
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Ob/Gyn Physician 0.031 * 0.157 * 0.163 *
(0.011) (0.037) (0.037)
Year 2000 0.052 * 0.135 * 0.144 *
(0.009) (0.027) (0.027)
Year 2001 0.106 * 0.197 * 0.228 *
(0.009) (0.027) (0.027)
Year 2002 0.177 * 0.366 * 0.397 *
(0.009) (0.027) (0.027)
Intercept - -2.058 * -2.125 *
- (0.067) (0.068)
Correlation - - -0.422 *
- - (0.018)
Degree of physician incentives - 0.034 0.032
(Mean of marginal probability) - (0.012) (0.012)
Log-Likelihood function -159,942.87 -160,363.97 -160,307.28
Number of Observations 403,660 403,660 403,660
Dependent variable is mode of delivery. 1 if it was a cesarean section, 0 if it was a vaginal delivery.
Estimation was done in GAUSS. Program code is available under request.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
* Signicant at 1%. ** Signicant at 5%. *** Signicant at 10%
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